You are here: / / WHEN THE TERMS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT WERE DISCUSSED BOTH TWO AND THREE-YEAR...
, , ,

WHEN THE TERMS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT WERE DISCUSSED BOTH TWO AND THREE-YEAR SENTENCES WERE MENTIONED; DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED TO THREE YEARS; DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS THEREFORE NOT VOLUNTARY; THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED BY A MOTION AND WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined defendant was not clearly informed of the sentence, rendering his plea involuntary. Although the issue was not preserved by a motion, the Third Department considered the appeal in the interest of justice:

… [W]hen the terms of the plea agreement were placed on the record, it was stated that the prison term to be imposed would be two years. County Court then, in discussing defendant’s second felony offender status, stated that the prison term was three years but, thereafter, informed defendant that, if he violated any jail rules prior to sentencing, it would not be bound by the promise of a two-year prison term. The record does not reflect that there was any clarification or correction regarding the misstatements as to the agreed-upon sentence either during the plea colloquy or at sentencing before a three-year prison term was imposed. As “[t]he record thus fails to reveal that defendant was accurately advised of the essential terms and conditions of the plea agreement” … , we find that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. People v Lumpkin, 2022 NY Slip Op 00477, Third Dept 1-27-22

 

You might also like
THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD’S CONCLUSION THAT CLAIMANT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER RESCUE AND CLEANUP OPERATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (THIRD DEPT).
Petitioner Not Given Adequate Employee Assistance—Determination Annulled—New Hearing Ordered
THE “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES” WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY RETAINING THE 17-YEAR-OLD’S BURGLARY PROSECUTION IN COUNTY COURT WERE NOT DEMONSTRATED; THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO FAMILY COURT; THE CRITERIA FOR RETENTION IN COUNTY COURT ARE EXPLAINED IN DEPTH (THIRD DEPT).
Events Before Last Custody Order Could Be Considered re: “Best Interests of Child” Even Though Only Post-Custody-Order Events Can Be Considered re: “Change of Circumstances”
THE FACT THAT THE CONTAMINATED AREA WHERE THE NEW CONSTRUCTION WAS TO BE LOCATED HAD BEEN REMEDIATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (DEC) WAS NOT ENOUGH TO ENSURE SAFETY WHEN THE SOIL IS DISTURBED FOR CONSTRUCTION; THE SEQRA REVIEW DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE EFFECTS OF DISTURBING THE SOIL (THIRD DEPT).
THE BUILT-IN WATER HEATER WAS A “STRUCTURE” AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN “REPAIR” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240(1); A SHELF ROUTINELY USED AS A PLATFORM TO ACCESS THE BUILT-IN WATER HEATER COULD CONSTITUTE A DANGEROUS CONDITION WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 200 (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH COUNTY COURT ISSUED, ENTERED AND FILED A DECISION ADJUDICATING DEFENDANT A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER, THERE WAS NO LANGUAGE INDICATING THE DECISION WAS A JUDGMENT OR AN ORDER; IN ADDITION, THE RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT DID NOT INCLUDE “SO ORDERED” LANGUAGE; THEREFORE THERE WAS NO APPEALABLE ORDER BEFORE THE COURT AND THE APPEAL WAS DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S ACTIONS WERE NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL FROM A MAKESHIFT PLATFORM ON A LULL (FORKLIFT) USED TO REACH ELEVATED AREAS; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE HOMEOWNER WHO LEASED THE LULL AND DIRECTED PLAINTIFF’S WORK SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PETITIONER POLICE OFFICER’S SITTING IN A DESK CHAIR (WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY... IN THIS MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY PROCEEDING, FATHER PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE...