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No Negligence Based on Defendant’s Dog Barking [Which Allegedly Caused Plaintiff to Fall from Her Horse as the Horse Broke Into a Run]

Plaintiff was injured when she fell from her horse.  The defendant was jogging behind the horse with her dogs. Plaintiff alleged barking caused the horse to break into a canter or a run.  The Third Department determined Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  After discussing the principles underlying assumption of the risk in this context and the permissible causes of action based on the behavior of animals, the Third Department wrote:

“The mere act of [walking] . . . in close proximity to an unknown horse, as the complaint alleges, does  not present an  issue of negligence, as a matter of law” …. In this regard, defendant – who had  no  prior experience with horses – was  walking on  a public highway, where  she had  every right to be  (see Vehicle and  Traffic Law  §  1156  [b]).  She slowed down  to evaluate the horses and riders ahead  of her, and, while she did not stop, she was  still 50 yards away when plaintiff and her daughter lost control of their horses. Morever, plaintiffs’ negligence claim also fails because they alleged no facts from which it could be inferred that defendant’s actions, in walking on a public street or otherwise, were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries … . Filer v Adams, 515403, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

 

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