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No “Negligent Supervision” Cause of Action Against School Based on Student Attacking Another Student

In ruling that the defendant school district’s motion for summary judgment in a “negligent supervision” case should have been granted, the Third Department determined the school district could not have reasonably anticipated the attack of one student upon another.  The school personnel had been alerted to the possibility of an impending fight between the two students and had intervened.  The school personnel were assured by the student who ultimately attacked plaintiff’s daughter that she did not intend to fight plaintiff’s daughter.  The Third Department wrote:

…[A] school district will only be held liable for injuries intentionally inflicted by another  student  where  it is established that the dangerous conduct “could reasonably have been anticipated,” i.e., where school authorities had actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct on the part of the offending student ….  Even where such notice is present and the consequent duty of supervision is breached, the plaintiff must further show that the alleged injury “was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the school’s negligence”  … .The adequacy of supervision and the existence of proximate cause  are generally factual issues for a  jury to resolve … .

Regardless of any questions of fact regarding whether enough staff members were present in the hallway to prevent or break up the fight, defendant was entitled to summary judgment because it established that it could not have reasonably anticipated the attack.  Conklin v Saugerties Central School District, 515709, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

 

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