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DEFENDANT ALLEGED ITS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS WAS IN NASSAU COUNTY BUT NEVER AMENDED ITS CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION WHICH DESIGNATED ITS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS AS QUEENS COUNTY; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE FROM QUEENS TO NASSAU COUNTY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this slip and fall case (Valley Park) did not present sufficient evidence to support a change of venue from Queens County to Nassau County:

“To effect a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(1), a defendant must show that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is improper and that its choice of venue is proper” … . To succeed on its motion, Valley Park was obligated to demonstrate that, on the date that this action was commenced, none of the parties resided in Queens County … . Only if Valley Park made such a showing was the plaintiff required to establish, in opposition, via documentary evidence, that the venue she selected was proper … .

… Although Valley Park claimed that its principal office was in Nassau County and that it no longer maintained its principal office in Queens County, it failed to prove that its certificate of incorporation had been amended to designate a county other than Queens … . The plaintiff’s submission, in opposition, of a certified copy of Valley Park’s certificate of incorporation, which stated that Valley Park’s principal office was located in Queens County, further underscored that her choice of venue was proper. Green v Duga, 2021 NY Slip Op 06990, Second Dept 12-15-21

 

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