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Plaintiff Entitled to Summary Judgment in Rear-End Collision Case—Plaintiff’s Statements in Hospital Record Not Admissible—No Relation to Diagnosis and Not Admissions

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on liability in a rear-end collision case. Plaintiff was driving 30 miles an hour when her car was struck from behind, indicating defendant-driver did not maintain a safe distance between the two cars. The court noted that statements made by the plaintiff which were memorialized in a hospital record were inadmissible because the statements were not necessary for diagnostic purposes and were not admissions:

Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating, through her affidavit, that she was operating her vehicle in a lane of the Cross Bronx Expressway, proceeding straight ahead at approximately 30 miles per hour with her foot on the gas pedal, when her vehicle was struck in the rear within her lane of travel, suddenly and without warning, by the defendants’ vehicle. Thus, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that [defendant-driver] was negligent in failing to maintain a safe distance behind her vehicle, and that she did not contribute to the happening of the accident … . * * *

… [T]he defendants could not rely on certain statements in the plaintiff’s hospital records to raise a triable issue of fact, since, under the circumstances presented here, the details of how the plaintiff sustained particular injuries and how the accident occurred in this matter were not useful for purposes of her medical diagnosis or treatment and, accordingly, a medical chart entry containing such hearsay statements could not be considered to have been prepared in the regular course of the hospital’s business … . Accordingly, the statements contained in the chart entry are not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Moreover, the entry was not inconsistent with the plaintiff’s description of the accident, as provided in her affidavit. Consequently, the entry was not admissible as an admission by the plaintiff … . Service v McCoy, 2015 NY Slip Op 06801, 2nd Dept 9-16-15

 

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