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DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF ANY DEFECTS IN THE CEILING THAT FELL ON PLAINTIFFS; THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY BECAUSE DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER THE CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this premises liability case should have been granted. Plaintiffs alleged a portion of their bedroom ceiling collapsed on them. Defendant owner of the property demonstrated the lack of actual or constructive notice of any defect in the ceiling. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine did not apply because the condition was not under defendants’ exclusive control:

The owner of property has a duty to maintain its property “in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk” … . Here, the defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating, prima facie, that they did not have actual or constructive notice that the bedroom ceiling was in a defective condition … . The evidence submitted by the defendants established that at least one of the plaintiffs had been residing in the third-floor apartment for more than four years, and that prior to the accident, the plaintiffs did not notice any defects in the bedroom ceiling, and had never complained to the defendants about the bedroom ceiling. Moreover, the debris and the ceiling from which it had fallen were dry, and there was no evidence of a leak in the building at or about the time of the accident.

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to the contention of the plaintiffs’ expert, in the absence of a warning about the existence of a latent defect, there was no duty to remove portions of the ceiling plaster to discover what lay behind it … . Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied to this case since the defendants did not have the requisite exclusive control over the allegedly defective condition … . Matson v Dermer Mgt., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 06842, Second Dept 12-8-21

 

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