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Intentional Conduct Cannot Be the Basis for a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Cause of Action

The Second Department determined a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot be based upon intentional conduct.  Plaintiff alleged he was attacked with a hammer by the defendant:

A cause of action to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which no longer requires physical injury as a necessary element, “generally must be premised upon the breach of a duty owed to [the] plaintiff which either unreasonably endangers the plaintiff’s physical safety, or causes the plaintiff to fear for his or her own safety” … . “Such a claim must fail, where, as here, no allegations of negligence appear in the pleadings'” … . Here the plaintiff’s allegations in the verified complaint that the defendant “deliberately and violently” attacked him with a hammer, while using racial and ethnic slurs, are premised on intentional conduct and not negligence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action. Santana v Leith, 2014 NY Slip Op 03251, 2nd Dept 5-7-14

 

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