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FAMILY COURT DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED INQUIRIES BEFORE DETERMINING NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS NEGLECT PROCEEDING; MOTHER AND CHILD WERE IN CONNECTICUT, FATHER RESIDED IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court did not make the required inquiries before finding New York did not have jurisdiction over this neglect proceeding. Mother and child lived in Connecticut and father resided in Westchester County:

The Family Court’s jurisdiction in this child protective proceeding is governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act … . Nevertheless, the court failed to make any determination as to whether, despite the child’s Connecticut residence at the time of the filing of the petition, it had jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76 on the basis that New York was the child’s “home state” … . The court further failed to determine whether it had temporary emergency jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76-c … .. In addition, although a criminal proceeding was allegedly pending in Connecticut, the court failed to determine whether a “proceeding concerning the custody of the child [had] been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction,” in which case the court would have been required to stay the proceedings and communicate with the court of the other state (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[1] …). Finally, in the event that the court determined that it was an inconvenient forum and that Connecticut was the more appropriate forum, there is no indication that the court considered the required factors (see Domestic Relations Law § 76-f[2][a]-[h]). Moreover, upon such a finding, the court is required to “stay the proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-f[3]). Matter of Jenny M. (Thomas M.), 2021 NY Slip Op 05701, Second Dept 10-20-21

 

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