You are here: / / THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER’S CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF HIS CHILD WAS...

THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER’S CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF HIS CHILD WAS NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE HE FAILED TO SUPPORT THE CHILD DESPITE THE MEANS TO DO SO (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined father’s consent to the adoption of his child is not required where the father has not maintained contact with the child:

“A biological father’s consent to adopt a child over six months old who was born out of wedlock is required only if the father ‘maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child as manifested by’ payment of reasonable child support and either monthly visitation or ‘regular communication’ with the subject child[ ] or custodian” … . “Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d) imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father, and the father’s unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption[ ] is not required” … .

Here, the Family Court properly determined that the father, by failing to financially support the child, despite having the means to do so, did not maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child in accordance with Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d) … . Matter of Raniah M. K. (Joma K.), 2021 NY Slip Op 06616, Second Dept 11-24-21

 

You might also like
BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON THE PLEAS AND SENTENCING COMMITMENTS, THE SENTENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENHANCED BASED ON THE PURPORTED VIOLATIONS OF CERTAIN CONDITIONS, INCLUDING THE DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO APPEAR AT SENTENCING, ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE APPELLATE COURT CONSIDERED IT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE SUMMONED A NECESSARY PARTY WHICH WAS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 1001; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE A DEFENDANT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, DESPITE THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LAW-OFFICE-FAILURE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT).
DEFAMATION ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED PRE-DISCOVERY MOTION TO DISMISS, APPLICABILITY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW PRIVILEGE FOR REPORTING ON A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING NOT DEMONSTRATED AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).
RIDING A BICYCLE ON A PUBLIC PATH USED BY BOTH BICYCLISTS AND PEDESTRIANS IS NOT A RECREATIONAL ACTIVITY WHICH TRIGGERS THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).
BECAUSE THE OFFENSE TO WHICH DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY (ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD) WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ANY OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT, IT IS NOT CLASSIFIED AS A VIOLENT FELONY; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT). ​
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A LEFT TURN WHEN PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS TOO CLOSE IN THE ON-COMING LANE (SECOND DEPT).
A SENTENCE CANNOT BE SET ASIDE AS EXCESSIVE PURSUANT TO A CPL 440.20 MOTION (SECOND DEPT).
THE 2020 AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE DO NOT APPLY AS A DEFENSE TO THIS DEFAMATION ACTION BASED UPON DEFENDANTS’ CRITICISM OF PLAINTIFF DOG-GROOMER POSTED ON SOCIAL MEDIA (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL... THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE READ TO DEFENDANT BEFORE...