You are here: / / THE SUFFOLK COUNTY CODE PROVISIONS WHICH ALLOW THE SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE...
, , ,

THE SUFFOLK COUNTY CODE PROVISIONS WHICH ALLOW THE SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF VEHICLES USED BY DRUNK DRIVERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCormack, determined the provisions of the Suffolk County Code which provide for the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used by drunk drivers is constitutional:

On this appeal, we are called upon to consider the validity of Suffolk County’s civil forfeiture statute, codified in chapter 420, article II (hereinafter chapter 420) of the Code of Suffolk County (hereinafter the Code), pursuant to which a vehicle being operated by the defendant Hassan Qamar (hereinafter the defendant) was seized at the time of his arrest for driving while intoxicated. The defendant challenges the validity of chapter 420 of the Code on three bases: (1) that the procedures relating to the post-seizure hearings conducted pursuant thereto violate article VI of the New York State Constitution, and deprived him of due process of law, (2) that the provisions of chapter 420 of the Code are preempted by State law, and (3) that the forfeiture of his vehicle constitutes an excessive fine prohibited by the State and Federal Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the defendant’s challenges to the procedures involving the post-seizure hearing have been rendered academic, and that there is no merit to his remaining challenges. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. * * *

… [A] Suffolk County Police Department (hereinafter the SCPD) police officer observed the defendant operating a Nissan Altima (hereinafter the vehicle) on Pulaski Road in Huntington at a speed of 100 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone and passing a steady red traffic control light. According to the felony complaint, the defendant, inter alia, had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and admitted having “a few beers and a few shots of J[a]m[e]son[ ] W[h]iskey.” The defendant purportedly displayed “clues indicative of intoxication upon submitting to standardized field sobriety test” and submitted to a chemical breath test that resulted in a .20% blood alcohol content. The defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated per se pursuant to VTL § 1192(2-a)(a) and driving while intoxicated pursuant to VTL § 1192(3). The defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated pursuant to VTL § 1192(3) on April 1, 2015. The vehicle was seized and impounded by the SCPD pursuant to chapter 420 of the Code. * * *

… [T]he defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated driving while intoxicated per se pursuant to VTL § 1192(2-a)(a), with one prior conviction. …

 … [T]he plaintiff commenced this civil forfeiture action pursuant to chapter 420 of the Code, seeking forfeiture of the defendant’s vehicle.   Cohen v A 2019 Nissan, 2026 NY Slip Op 05158, Second Dept 9-2-26

 

You might also like
SECOND DEPARTMENT JOINS THE THIRD AND FOURTH DEPARTMENTS IN HOLDING INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES NEED NOT BE NAMED AS DEFENDANTS IN A NOTICE OF CLAIM.
STACKED BOXES NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; TENANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED; LANDLORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS AN OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD; HOWEVER, LANDLORD ESTABLISHED IT DID NOT CREATE OR HAVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).
TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200.
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF DRIVER HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, HE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF’S PASSENGER, HOWEVER.
ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS WHEN PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE ICY CONDITION EXISTED PRIOR TO THE STORM, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S EXPERT AFFIDAVIT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION DID NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS ASSERTED BY PLAINTIFFS; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 AND THE MORTGAGE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
FAILURE TO INCLUDE YEAR IN THE DATES OF THE SIGNATURES REQUIRED INVALIDATION OF THE DESIGNATING PETITION.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

HERE THE MEDICAL RECORDS SUGGESTED INJURY ATTRIBUTABLE TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE... ELECTRONIC FILING OF A MOTION TO CONFIRM A REFEREE’S REPORT AND FOR LEAVE...