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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT THAT THE SENTENCE...
Criminal Law, Judges

THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT THAT THE SENTENCE RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH A SENTENCE WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN IMPOSED BY A DIFFERENT COURT; THE APPROPRIATE APPELLATE REMEDY IS TO STRIKE THE DIRECTIVE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) County Court, In a full-fledged opinion by Justice NeMoyer, determined the sentencing court did not have the authority to order the sentence to run consecutively with a sentence that had not yet been imposed by a different court. The appropriate appellate remedy is to strike the directive, rather than send the matter back for resentencing:

A sentencing court has no power to dictate whether its sentence will run concurrently or consecutively to another sentence that has not yet been imposed. When a sentencing court violates that rule and purports to direct the relationship between its present sentence and an anticipated forthcoming sentence, the proper remedy is usually to strike the improper directive, not to remit for a new sentencing proceeding at which the court could exercise the very power it lacked originally. * * *

Rather than remitting for resentencing, the proper remedy under these circumstances is to simply vacate County Court’s improper directive with respect to consecutive sentencing. That remedy will put defendant in the same position as if County Court had not issued that illegal directive in the first place. Such a remedy will also adequately “protect” the People’s interests, since it will place them in the exact position they would have occupied had County Court not issued its illegal directive. Indeed, because the People had no legitimate right or interest in County Court’s original illegal sentence, the People have no right or interest that could be “protected” with a remittal order calculated only to achieve the very outcome — consecutive sentencing — that they had no right to obtain in the first place. People v Barthel, 2021 NY Slip Op 04834, Fourth Dept 8-26-21

 

August 26, 2021
Tags: Fourth Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-08-26 10:15:042021-08-29 10:32:22THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT THAT THE SENTENCE RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH A SENTENCE WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN IMPOSED BY A DIFFERENT COURT; THE APPROPRIATE APPELLATE REMEDY IS TO STRIKE THE DIRECTIVE (FOURTH DEPT).
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