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THE MAYOR’S STATEMENTS WERE TRUE AND DID NOT EVINCE MALICE; PLAINTIFF’S TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s tortious interference with contract cause of action should have been dismissed. Plaintiff, was the head of a charter school, The mayor of Rochester (Warren) criticized the school for refusing to allow the school’s first African American valedictorian to give a speech at graduation:

To establish a tortious interference cause of action, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that [the plaintiff] had a business relationship with a third party; (2) that the defendant knew of that relationship and intentionally interfered with it; (3) that the defendant acted solely out of malice or used improper or illegal means that amounted to a crime or independent tort; and (4) that the defendant’s interference caused injury to the [plaintiff’s] relationship with the third party” … . …

Plaintiff testified that he did not allow the student to speak at the graduation ceremony, and the record establishes that Warren’s statements, i.e., that “[the student’s] school did not allow him to give his valedictorian speech. For some reason, his school, in a country where freedom of speech is a constitutional right, in the city of Frederick Douglass[,] turned his moment of triumph into a time of sorrow, and pain,” that the student would “never get that moment back,” and that “[t]his is not a time to punish a child because you may not like what they say,” were substantially true … . Moreover, in her statements, Warren did not mention plaintiff by name and referred only to the conduct of the “school,” and the statements were made during Warren’s introduction of the student in the context of providing him with an opportunity to present publicly the valedictory speech that the student was not permitted to give at his graduation ceremony. On that evidence, it cannot be said that defendants “acted solely out of malice” toward plaintiff … . Munno v City of Rochester, 2021 NY Slip Op 04830, Fourth Dept 8-26-21

 

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