The Fourth Department determined the Department of Social Services (DSS) was not a “victim” within the meaning of Penal Law 60.27 and therefore the defendant could not be ordered to pay restitution to the DSS for expenses incurred caring for the child-victim of defendant's crime:
It is well established that restitution may be required for expenses that “were not voluntarily incurred, but stem from legal obligations that are directly and causally related to the crime” … . Here, however, the foster care expenses are the result of the placement of the victim in the care and custody of DSS pursuant to a proceeding in Family Court (see Family Ct Act § 1055 [1]), and thus DSS is performing its statutory duty pursuant to Social Services Law § 398 (2) (b). We note that the Legislature has specifically provided that certain governmental agencies and entities are entitled to restitution when performing their statutory duties (see Penal Law § 60.27 [9], [10], [13]). Section 60.27 (9), for example, was enacted to permit restitution to police agencies for unrecovered funds used in undercover drug purchases following the decision in People v Rowe (152 AD2d 907, 909, affd 75 NY2d 948, 949). In Rowe, we determined that, absent legislative intent to include a city police department as a “victim,” such funds could not be recovered by means of a court order of restitution. Similarly, here, in the absence of legislative intent that DSS is a “victim” pursuant to Penal Law § 60.27, we decline to impose an obligation on defendant to pay restitution for the expenditure of public funds for providing foster care for the victim. People v Johnson, 2015 NY Slip Op 01107, 4th Dept 2-6-15