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(Harmless) Error to Admit Voice Identification Testimony—The People Did Not Provide Notice of the Testimony and the Identification Was Not Merely Confirmatory

The Fourth Department noted that voice identification testimony should not have been allowed because the people did not provide notice of it and it was not merely confirmatory.  The error was deemed harmless however:

We agree with defendant that the court erred in allowing one of the victims to offer voice identification testimony at trial. Prior to trial, the prosecutor had the victim listen to recordings of telephone calls allegedly made by defendant from jail, and the victim identified the voice of the person making the calls as belonging to defendant. The victim offered similar testimony at trial over defendant’s objection. Because the People failed to provide defendant with notice of the pretrial voice identification procedure as required by CPL 710.30 (1) …, the voice identification testimony was admissible at trial only if the identification was merely confirmatory as a matter of law … . Contrary to the People’s contention, the victim’s identification of defendant’s voice was not merely confirmatory inasmuch as the victim acknowledged that, although he had heard defendant speak a number of times in the neighborhood, he and defendant had never actually spoken to each other. We thus conclude that the People did not establish as a matter of law that the victim was so familiar with defendant’s voice that “the identification at issue could not be the product of undue suggestiveness” … . People v Ramos, 2015 NY Slip OOp 00049, 4th Dept 1-2-15

 

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