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THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE, BUT THERE WAS A QUESTION WHETHER THE AGREEMENT WAS THE PRODUCT OF OVERREACHING, HEARING ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although the separation agreement was not unconscionable, there were questions of fact whether the agreement was the product of overreaching requiring a hearing:

While the defendant waived the right to maintenance, this provision, by itself, is insufficient to render the agreement unconscionable … .

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court should have held a hearing on the issue of whether the agreement should be set aside on the ground of overreaching. “Although courts may examine the terms of the agreement as well as the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether there has been overreaching, the general rule is that if the execution of the agreement is fair, no further inquiry will be made” … . No actual fraud needs to be shown in order to set aside an agreement, but “the challenging party must show overreaching in the execution, such as the concealment of facts, misrepresentation, cunning, cheating, sharp practice, or some other form of deception” … .

Here, the agreement reflects a vast disparity between the parties’ assets at the time of its execution. Moreover, the defendant’s submissions suggest that the plaintiff may have unilaterally selected and paid the defendant’s attorney, and that negotiations between the parties’ attorneys went on for approximately six weeks prior to the defendant’s initial consultation with her attorney. Marinakis v Marinakis, 2021 NY Slip Op 04218, Second Dept 7-7-21

 

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