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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE FATHER’S PARENTAL ACCESS TO THE PETITIONER, THE DECEASED MOTHER’S COUSIN, IN THIS GUARDIANSHIP CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, noted that a judge cannot delegate the authority to determine father’s parental access, here the mother’s cousin petitioned to become the child’s guardian:

… “[A] court may not delegate its authority to determine parental access to either a parent or a child” … . In this case, the Family Court improperly delegated the determination of the father’s parental access to the petitioner. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Family Court, Suffolk County, to expeditiously establish an appropriate schedule for the father’s parental access in accordance with the best interests of the child … . Matter of Madelyn E. P. (Christine L.-B.–Kevin O.), 2021 NY Slip Op 04228, Second Dept 7-7-21

 

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