You are here: / / TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL...
,

TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s injury from a fall on a staircase was not covered by the “additional insured” provision of the subject policy. Yeshiva leased property in a building owned by Beth Medrash. Beth Medrash was listed as an additional insured in Yeshiva’s insurance policy. The staircase where plaintiff fell was not leased by Yeshiva:

The additional insured provision named Beth Medrash as an additional insured “only with respect to liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased to [the Yeshiva].” The phrase “arising out of” requires “only that there be some causal relationship between the injury and the risk for which coverage is provided” … . “An insurer does not wish to be liable for losses arising from risks associated with . . . premises for which the insurer has not evaluated the risk and received a premium” … . Moreover, “unambiguous provisions of an insurance contract must be given their plain and ordinary meaning”… . The interpretation of policy language is a question of law for the court … .

On his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that the policy provided coverage to Beth Medrash as an additional insured for his injury. It is undisputed that the Yeshiva did not lease the staircase the plaintiff was descending when he fell, and that the plaintiff was not a student or invitee of the Yeshiva at the time of the accident. Therefore, there was no causal relationship between the plaintiff’s injury and the risk for which coverage was provided … . Consequently, the plaintiff’s injury was not a bargained-for risK … . Lissauer v GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins., 2018 NY Slip Op 03522, Second Dept 5-16-18

​INSURANCE LAW (TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (INSURANCE LAW, TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT))/ADDITIONAL INSURED (LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (LANDLORD-TENANT, INSURANCE LAW, TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
FATHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR DID NOT JUSTIFY FAMILY COURT’S AWARD OF CUSTODY TO MOTHER WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT ASSERT THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF LACK OF STANDING AND LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE ANSWER, THE DEFENSES WERE NOT WAIVED AND THE MOTION TO AMEND THE ANSWER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EVEN THOUGH THE STATUTE PROVIDING THAT THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE WAS NOT WAIVED WAS NOT ENACTED AT THE TIME THE MOTION WAS DECIDED, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN APPLY THE LAW AS IT EXISTS AT THE TIME OF THE APPELLATE DECISION (SECOND DEPT).
THE 21-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN THE CRIME AND DEFENDANT’S ARREST DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT’S SPEEDY-TRIAL RIGHTS (SECOND DEPT).
CHAIN BETWEEN TWO POLES NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION, SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRIP AND FALL CASE PROPERLY DENIED.
THE POLICE WERE JUSTIFIED IN STOPPING A BICYCLIST WHO WAS WEAVING AND HOLDING A BULKY OBJECT IN HIS WAISTBAND; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFAMATORY REMARKS MADE AT A MUNICIPAL PUBLIC MEETING HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MEETING AND THEREFORE WERE NOT ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED, PLAINTIFF’S DEFAMATION ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED A MOTION TO DISMISS (SECOND DEPT).
THE 2014 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY COMMITTEE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILL VACANCIES IN THE 2016 COUNTY COMMITTEE (SECOND DEPT).
DESPITE AMBIGUITIES IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE EASEMENT, THE LOCATION CAN BE DETERMINED AND THE EASEMENT IS THEREFORE VALID (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

RECOVERY FROM THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION FOR INJURY... QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SAFETY DEVICE WAS REQUIRED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1)...