You are here: / / TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL...
,

TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s injury from a fall on a staircase was not covered by the “additional insured” provision of the subject policy. Yeshiva leased property in a building owned by Beth Medrash. Beth Medrash was listed as an additional insured in Yeshiva’s insurance policy. The staircase where plaintiff fell was not leased by Yeshiva:

The additional insured provision named Beth Medrash as an additional insured “only with respect to liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased to [the Yeshiva].” The phrase “arising out of” requires “only that there be some causal relationship between the injury and the risk for which coverage is provided” … . “An insurer does not wish to be liable for losses arising from risks associated with . . . premises for which the insurer has not evaluated the risk and received a premium” … . Moreover, “unambiguous provisions of an insurance contract must be given their plain and ordinary meaning”… . The interpretation of policy language is a question of law for the court … .

On his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that the policy provided coverage to Beth Medrash as an additional insured for his injury. It is undisputed that the Yeshiva did not lease the staircase the plaintiff was descending when he fell, and that the plaintiff was not a student or invitee of the Yeshiva at the time of the accident. Therefore, there was no causal relationship between the plaintiff’s injury and the risk for which coverage was provided … . Consequently, the plaintiff’s injury was not a bargained-for risK … . Lissauer v GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins., 2018 NY Slip Op 03522, Second Dept 5-16-18

​INSURANCE LAW (TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (INSURANCE LAW, TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT))/ADDITIONAL INSURED (LANDLORD-TENANT, TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (LANDLORD-TENANT, INSURANCE LAW, TENANT’S INSURANCE POLICY NAMED THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED, PLAINTIFF FELL ON A STAIRCASE IN AN AREA NOT LEASED TO THE TENANT, PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER UNDER THE ADDITIONAL INSURED PROVISION OF THE TENANT’S POLICY (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
TOWN’S COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, WHICH WAS ADOPTED WHILE PETITIONER’S DEVELOPMENT PROJECT APPLICATION WAS PENDING AND NEGATIVELY AFFECTED IT, WAS PROPERLY ADOPTED UNDER THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, TOWN LAW AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA), AND WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE TOWN’S POLICE AND ZONING POWERS (SECOND DEPT).
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE A CLAIM CAN BE FILED BY ANY INTERESTED PERSON, THE NOTICE WAS NOT INVALID BECAUSE THE FILER, DECEDENT’S WIFE, WAS NOT REPRESENTING DECEDENT’S ESTATE AT THE TIME 2ND DEPT.
Plaintiff’s Requests to be Deposed (in China) by Remote Electronic Means and to Use a Video Transcription of the Deposition In Lieu of Testifying at Trial Should Not Have Been Denied
PLAINTIFF FIREFIGHTER ALLEGED DEBRIS ON STAIRS IN DEFENDANT’S HOME CAUSED HIM TO FALL WHILE FIGHTING A FIRE; THE DEBRIS DID NOT VIOLATE THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE SO THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-A CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED; HOWEVER THE COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Plaintiff Barred from Recovery Against Special Employer by Exclusivity Provisions of Workers’ Compensation Law
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF’S FAVOR, PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED A POLICE REPORT WHICH RAISED THE QUESTIONS OF FACT, BY SUBMITTING THE REPORT PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY OBJECTIONS TO INADMISSIBLE STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN IT (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS WORKING ON A ROOF WHEN HE ALLEGEDLY CONTACTED AN ELECTRIC WIRE LEADING TO THE HOME AND WAS KILLED; THE UTILITIES’ (CON EDISON’S) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE GROUND IT OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

RECOVERY FROM THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION FOR INJURY... QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SAFETY DEVICE WAS REQUIRED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1)...