You are here: / / DEFENDANT NEVER CONSENTED TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL IN THIS FORECLOSURE...
,

DEFENDANT NEVER CONSENTED TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SERVED ON THE PURPORTED SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL, WAS NEVER SERVED UPON DEFENDANT AND WAS THEREFORE NULLIFIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determine the plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment in this foreclosure action was not properly served and therefore must be reversed. The papers were served on an attorney but defendant had not consented to the substitution of thst attorney:

… [T]he record demonstrates that the plaintiff served its motion, inter alia, for an order of reference and its motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, on [attorney] Elo, not [defendant] Nakash or CAMBA [legal services]. Nakash retained CAMBA in July 2011 to appear on her behalf at the settlement conferences. Although in April 2013, CAMBA and Elo signed a substitution of counsel, Nakash never acknowledged or signed this substitution, nor was a substitution ordered by the Supreme Court. Moreover, Nakash attested that she did not know Elo, never authorized him to represent her, and never received the plaintiff’s motion papers or any orders from the court. Since the substitution was improper under CPLR 321(b), CAMBA, not Elo, was Nakash’s attorney of record when the plaintiff made its motions, and thus, the plaintiff failed to properly serve Nakash with these motions, depriving the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to entertain these motions and rendering so much of the resulting order dated March 17, 2014, and the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale as are in favor of the plaintiff and against Nakash nullities that must be vacated … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Nakash, 2021 NY Slip Op 03479, Second Dept 6-2-21

 

You might also like
THE COMPANY WHICH STAFFED THE HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED PLAINTIFF IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WERE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS, AS OPPOSED TO EMPLOYEES FOR WHOM THE COMPANY WOULD BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE (SECOND DEPT).
FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 90-DAY DEMAND AND OVERALL DELAY AND NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT).
BANK’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTS VERIFIED OR AFFIRMED BY PERSONS WITHOUT FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE, MOTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BUT COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SUA SPONTE (SECOND DEPT).
WHEEL STOP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS AND NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS.
THE ASSAULT ON PLAINTIFF STUDENT BY ANOTHER STUDENT HAPPENED IN SO SHORT A TIME IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY SCHOOL PERSONNEL; THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
STRIKING THE COMPLAINT WAS TOO SEVERE A SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY DEMANDS; $2500 PENALTY IMPOSED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS THE PRODUCT OF SUBSTANTIAL CONFUSION, SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO “REINSTATE” A PRIOR VERDICT THAT HAD NOT BEEN REPORTED TO THE JUDGE.
Defense Counsel’s Failure to Request that the Jury Be Charged with an Affirmative Defense to Robbery First (Weapon Was Not Capable of Being Discharged) Constituted Ineffective Assistance

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE JURY’S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE WAS NEGLIGENT... PLAINTIFF’S ACTION ALLEGING INADEQUATE BUILDING SECURITY WAS A PROXIMATE...