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THE JURY’S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE WAS NEGLIGENT BUT THAT DEFENDANT WAS 100% RESPONSIBLE WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’S DOCTOR TO TESTIFY DEFENDANT’S DOCTOR WAS HIRED BY AN INSURANCE COMPANY, WITHOUT GIVING A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION, WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, ordering a new trial on liability and damages in this slip and fall case, determined the finding that plaintiff was negligent but that defendant was 100% responsible was against the weight of the evidence. In addition, allowing plaintiff’s physician to mention that defendant’s physician was hired by an insurance company was reversible error. Both parties had requested Pattern Jury Instruction (PJI) 2:36 on comparative fault. The judge denied that request and instructed the jury with PJI 2:90 which addresses comparative fault. The First Department did not find the denial of the request for PJI 2-36 was error, but noted that the jury clearly misunderstood the concept of comparative fault. Plaintiff alleged she tripped over a stool which was two-feet high:

It is clear that the jury’s verdict, finding that plaintiff was negligent, but that her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident was against the weight of the evidence, and indicates that the jury had a fundamental misunderstanding of the concept of comparative negligence. In this case, “the issues of negligence and proximate cause are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause.” * * *

Evidence that a defendant carries liability insurance is generally inadmissible, as it is both collateral and prejudicial … . The passing reference to insurance or similar benefits will not necessarily result in reversal … . However, if the testimony goes beyond mere mention of insurance, then a mistrial may be warranted … . Here, plaintiff’s doctor’s testimony, together with the court’s failure to immediately give a curative instruction was prejudicial, and constituted reversible error, further warranting a new trial. Campbell v St. Barnabas Hosp., 2021 NY Slip Op 03404, First Dept 6-1-21

 

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