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PETITIONER SOUGHT ATTORNEY’S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY PURSUANT TO NEW YORK’S EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT UNDER THE “CATALYST THEORY;” THE 4TH DEPARTMENT REJECTED THE CATALYST THEORY, FINDING PETITIONER WAS NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY UNDER THE TERMS OF THE STATUTE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the so-called “catalyst theory” did not apply to New York’s Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The EAJA, in certain circumstances, allows a prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees against the state. Here petitioner argued that petitioner’s seeking reconsideration of a determination by the NYS Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD) prompted the OPWDD to grant petitioner’s application. Petitioner argued the request for reconsideration was the “catalyst” for the OPWDD’s granting the application and petitioner was therefore entitled to attorney’s fees. The Fourth Department determined petitioner was not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of the NYS EAJA:

This Court has yet to address the issue, but we now reject application of the catalyst theory in State EAJA cases. Where, as here, litigation is rendered moot by an administrative change in position, the petitioner or plaintiff has not prevailed “in the civil action” (CPLR 8602 [f]). Matter of Criss v New York State Dept. of Health, 2021 NY Slip Op 01642, Fourth Dept 3-19-21

 

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