You are here: / / LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG-BITE CASE SHOULD...
, ,

LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS DOG-BITE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF BITTEN BY TENANT’S DOG (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this dog-bite case should have been granted. The landlord was aware the tenant had a dog, and could have required the removal of the dog, but was not aware whether the dog had vicious propensities. The court noted that theories of common-law negligence are not applicable:

It is well established that ” [t]o recover against a landlord for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog on a theory of strict liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord: (1) had notice that a dog was being harbored on the premises[,] (2) knew or should have known that the dog had vicious propensities, and (3) had sufficient control of the premises to allow the landlord to remove or confine the dog’ ” … . Here, it is undisputed that defendant was aware that a dog was kept on the premises by his tenants and that he could have required them to remove or confine the dog. Nevertheless, defendant met his initial burden on the motion by establishing as a matter of law that he lacked actual or constructive knowledge that his tenants’ dog had any vicious propensities … .

Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint includes a negligence cause of action, we conclude that the court erred in failing to dismiss that cause of action inasmuch as “[c]ases involving injuries inflicted by domestic animals may only proceed under strict liability based on the owner’s knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensities, not on theories of common-law negligence” … . Toher v Duchnycz, 2019 NY Slip Op 03487, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

You might also like
SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE CONDUCTED A HEARING ON THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT ALLEGING RACIAL BIAS AMONG JURORS (FOURTH DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF FALLING FROM A CLIMBING WALL (FOURTH DEPT).
FAILURE TO RULE ON A MOTION FOR A TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS NOT A DENIAL OF THE MOTION; THE MATTER MUST BE SENT BACK FOR A RULING (FOURTH DEPT).
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SLIPPED ON ICE AND SNOW SEVERAL HOURS BEFORE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL IN THE SAME PARKING LOT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT DEFENDANT’S CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (FOURTH DEPT).
QUESTIONS OF FACT (1) WHETHER DEFENDANTS WERE CASUAL SELLERS OF THE GAS PUMPS SOLD TO A SCRAP YARD AND THEREFORE OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO THE INJURED PLAINTIFF AND (2) WHETHER DEFENDANTS OWED PLAINTIFF A DUTY OF CARE BECAUSE THE PRESENCE OF GASOLINE IN THE PUMP WHICH EXPLODED WAS NOT OPEN AND OBVIOUS (FOURTH DEPT).​
SHERIFF IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; SHERIFF, THEREFORE, IS NOT UNITED IN INTEREST WITH THE SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT OR THE COUNTY; RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY; SHERIFF CANNOT BE ADDED TO THE COMPLAINT AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN.
State Court Did Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over “Dangerous Sex Offender” Civil Management Proceeding Because Defendant Would Not Be Released Upon Finishing State Sentence—Defendant Had 19 Years to Go on Federal Sentence
THE FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA THAT HIS SENTENCE WOULD INCLUDE A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVSION REQUIRED VACATION OF THE PLEA; BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF THE POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, PRESERVATION OF THE ERROR WAS NOT NECESSARY (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF, WHO FELL THROUGH A HOLE IN A HOUSE UNDER CONSTRUCTION, WAS NOT ENGAGED... THERE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE DEFENDANT SHARED THE CO-DEFENDANT’S...