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Cleaning Cement Truck After Cement-Delivery Not Covered by Labor Law 240

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined plaintiff was not engaged in an activity protected by Labor Law 240 at the time of the injury.  Plaintiff had just delivered concrete to the defendant farm and was cleaning his truck when he fell from a ladder attached to the truck:

…[W]e agree with defendant that the activity in which plaintiff was engaged at the time of his injury, i.e., the routine cleaning of his employer’s cement truck after making a delivery, “was not the kind of undertaking for which the Legislature sought to impose liability under Labor Law § 240′ ” … . Specifically, plaintiff “was not engaged in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing’ of a building or structure’ within the intended meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1)” … . Rather, he was “engaged in routine maintenance” of the cement truck, “which is not a protected activity under Labor Law § 240 (1)” … .

We reject the dissent’s view that this case is distinguishable from Koch because the plaintiff in that case was “merely a delivery driver” while “there is evidence here that plaintiff operated the machinery of the cement truck to assist in the pouring of the concrete as part of the construction of the silo.” Any such distinction, even if supported by the record, is irrelevant to the applicability of Labor Law § 240 (1).  Bish v Odell Farms Partnership, 2014 NY Slip Op 05063, 4th Dept 7-3-14

 

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