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PLAINTIFF CORPORATION’S FAILURE TO MAKE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO PRODUCE A FORMER EMPLOYEE FOR DEPOSITION BY DEFENDANT WARRANTED PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING TESTIMONY BY THE FORMER EMPLOYEE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3126, HOWEVER PRECLUSION OF SECONDARY AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE FORMER EMPLOYEE, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM ASSERTING ITS CLAIM, WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court properly found that plaintiff corporation did not make sufficient efforts to produce a former employer to be deposed by defendant in this breach of contract action, and therefore properly precluded plaintiff from presenting the former employee’s testimony. However, the Fourth Department held that Supreme Court abused its discretion when it precluded any secondary or hearsay evidence related to the former employee, which would preclude plaintiff from asserting its claim:

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Generally, where there is no evidence that a corporation exercises control over a former employee, that corporation cannot be held responsible for the former employee’s refusal to appear for a deposition … . Here, however, the firm representing plaintiff undertook the representation of that former employee, implicitly conceding control over the former employee … . When the court ordered plaintiff’s attorney to make every reasonable effort to secure the former employee’s appearance for a deposition, plaintiff’s attorney merely sent a letter notifying the former employee that the attorney was supposed to make additional efforts to secure her presence. There is no evidence that any actual efforts to secure her appearance were made. We thus agree with the court that plaintiff should be precluded from presenting testimony from the former employee.

We conclude, however, that the court abused its discretion in precluding plaintiff from relying on any secondary or hearsay evidence related to the former employee. There was no order compelling the production of such evidence that plaintiff was alleged to have violated, and the court did not find a willful failure to disclose such evidence. Hypercel Corp. v Stampede Presentation Prods., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 00936, Fourth Dept 2-9-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (EVIDENCE, PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO MAKE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO PRODUCE A FORMER EMPLOYEE FOR DEPOSITION BY DEFENDANT WARRANTED PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING TESTIMONY BY THE FORMER EMPLOYEE, HOWEVER PRECLUSION OF SECONDARY AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE FORMER EMPLOYEE, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM ASSERTING ITS CLAIM, WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE,  PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO MAKE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO PRODUCE A FORMER EMPLOYEE FOR DEPOSITION BY DEFENDANT WARRANTED PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING TESTIMONY BY THE FORMER EMPLOYEE, HOWEVER PRECLUSION OF SECONDARY AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE FORMER EMPLOYEE, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM ASSERTING ITS CLAIM, WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (FOURTH DEPT))/CPLR 3126 EVIDENCE, PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO MAKE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO PRODUCE A FORMER EMPLOYEE FOR DEPOSITION BY DEFENDANT WARRANTED PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING TESTIMONY BY THE FORMER EMPLOYEE, HOWEVER PRECLUSION OF SECONDARY AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE FORMER EMPLOYEE, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM ASSERTING ITS CLAIM, WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (FOURTH DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (CIVIL PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE, PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO MAKE A REASONABLE EFFORT TO PRODUCE A FORMER EMPLOYEE FOR DEPOSITION BY DEFENDANT WARRANTED PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING TESTIMONY BY THE FORMER EMPLOYEE, HOWEVER PRECLUSION OF SECONDARY AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE FORMER EMPLOYEE, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM ASSERTING ITS CLAIM, WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION (FOURTH DEPT))

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