You are here: / / THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES...
,

THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES FOR NONCITIZENS; MATTER REMITTED TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO VACATE HER GUILTY PLEA, DESPITE THE FACT DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE JUDGE THAT DEFENDANT SAID SHE WAS A CITIZEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department remitted the matter to allow defendant the opportunity to move to vacate her plea of guilty based upon the sentencing court’s failure to inform the defendant of the immigration consequences for noncitizens. Defense counsel had informed the court that defendant had informed him she was a citizen:

… [D]efense counsel’s statement during the plea proceeding that the defendant had informed him that she was a citizen of the United States did not absolve the court of its obligations pursuant to Peque [22 NY3d 168]. As we explained in People v Williams, “a trial court should not ask a defendant whether he or she is a United States citizen and decide whether to advise the defendant of the plea’s deportation consequence based on the defendant’s answer. Instead, a trial court should advise all defendants pleading guilty to felonies that, if they are not United States citizens, their felony guilty plea may expose them to deportation” … .

… [I]n the present case … the presentence investigation report explained that an “immigration record check” had revealed, among other things, that the defendant was not in the United States “legally.”

The defendant’s due process claim is thus properly presented on the defendant’s direct appeal, and in the absence of the warning required under Peque, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to afford the defendant an opportunity to move to vacate her plea, and for a report by the Supreme Court thereafter … . People v Ulanov, 2020 NY Slip Op 07108, Second Dept 11-25-20

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE CAR DEALER, DUE TO AN ERROR, DID NOT SUBMIT THE CORRECT REGISTRATION DOCUMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES WITHIN THE MANDATED FIVE-DAY PERIOD, THAT DEFECT DID NOT INVALIDATE THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR TO THE DRIVER INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT; THE DEALER WAS NOT THE OWNER OF THE CAR AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT HIS OWN LIABILTY; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT).
ZONING BOARD DID NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE DURATIONAL LIMIT ON PERMIT FOR A NONCONFORMING USE.
THE UNDERWRITING GUIDELINES DID NOT SUPPORT THE UNDERWRITER’S CLAIM THAT THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED IF THE COMPANY HAD BEEN AWARE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S HEART CONDITION; THEREFORE THE INSURANCE COMPANY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT MADE A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION (SECOND DEPT).
Supreme Court Should Have Proceeded to Second Step of Defendant’s “Batson” Challenge Alleging the Prosecutor’s Exclusion of Jurors on the Basis of Race
Re: a Slip and Fall in a McDonald’s Restaurant, the McDonald’s Defendants Were Not Liable as an Out-of-Possession Landlord, a Franchisor, or a Property Owner—Summary Judgment Properly Granted
THE ARTICLE 78 PETITION SOUGHT RELIEF NOT AVAILABLE IN SUCH A PROCEEDING (REMOVAL OF A TERRACE CONSTRUCTED ABOVE PETITIONER’S RESIDENCE); THE APPELLATE COURT CONVERTED THE PETITION TO A COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CPLR 103 (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS IN DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, SHE STILL CAN CONTEST THE AMOUNT OWED; THE REFEREE’S REPORT HERE WAS REJECTED BECAUSE IT WAS BASED IN PART ON UNPRODUCED BUSINESS RECORDS AND THE MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR RECALCULATION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD DEGREE IS NOT AN ARMED FELONY; MATTER... ALTHOUGH AN ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT HAD BEEN ISSUED, NO JUDGMENT DISMISSING...