You are here: / / THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES...
,

THE SENTENCING JUDGE DID NOT INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES FOR NONCITIZENS; MATTER REMITTED TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO VACATE HER GUILTY PLEA, DESPITE THE FACT DEFENSE COUNSEL TOLD THE JUDGE THAT DEFENDANT SAID SHE WAS A CITIZEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department remitted the matter to allow defendant the opportunity to move to vacate her plea of guilty based upon the sentencing court’s failure to inform the defendant of the immigration consequences for noncitizens. Defense counsel had informed the court that defendant had informed him she was a citizen:

… [D]efense counsel’s statement during the plea proceeding that the defendant had informed him that she was a citizen of the United States did not absolve the court of its obligations pursuant to Peque [22 NY3d 168]. As we explained in People v Williams, “a trial court should not ask a defendant whether he or she is a United States citizen and decide whether to advise the defendant of the plea’s deportation consequence based on the defendant’s answer. Instead, a trial court should advise all defendants pleading guilty to felonies that, if they are not United States citizens, their felony guilty plea may expose them to deportation” … .

… [I]n the present case … the presentence investigation report explained that an “immigration record check” had revealed, among other things, that the defendant was not in the United States “legally.”

The defendant’s due process claim is thus properly presented on the defendant’s direct appeal, and in the absence of the warning required under Peque, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to afford the defendant an opportunity to move to vacate her plea, and for a report by the Supreme Court thereafter … . People v Ulanov, 2020 NY Slip Op 07108, Second Dept 11-25-20

 

You might also like
THE SURGICAL PROCEDURE FOR WHICH THERE ALLEGEDLY WAS NO CONSENT WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED TO BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE CLAIMED INJURIES, THEREFORE THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED PURSUANT TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; A NEW TRIAL IS NECESSARY BECAUSE AN APPELLATE COURT CANNOT MAKE NEW FINDINGS OF FACT IN A JURY TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SUSTAINED, BAIL GRANTED.
THE PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL AND THE CITY DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF ANY ROADWAY DEFECTS IN THE AREA; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER OR THAT PLAINTIFF WAS DEFENDANT’S SPECIAL EMPLOYEE; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTION WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY ASPECT OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (SECOND DEPT).
Election of Remedies Provision in Labor Law 740 Precluded Retaliation Action Based Upon an Alleged Violation of NYC Administrative Code
REAL ESTATE BROKER ENTITLED TO COMMISSION, DEFENDANTS TERMINATED THE BROKER’S SERVICES IN BAD FAITH JUST BEFORE ENTERING THE LEASE AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT).
THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION (MVAIC) CANNOT DEMAND A RELEASE FROM THE PLAINTIFF ONCE THE MVAIC’S OBLIGATION TO PAY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD DEGREE IS NOT AN ARMED FELONY; MATTER... ALTHOUGH AN ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT HAD BEEN ISSUED, NO JUDGMENT DISMISSING...