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WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SUSTAINED, BAIL GRANTED.

The Second Department sustained defendant's writ of habeas corpus and set bail at $1,000,000, bond or cash, together with electronic monitoring and other conditions. The underlying facts were not discussed:

ADJUDGED that the writ is sustained, without costs or disbursements, bail on Richmond County Indictment No. 61/16 is granted in the sum of $1,000,000, which may be posted in the form of an insurance company bail bond in that sum or by depositing the sum of $1,000,000 as a cash bail alternative, on condition that (1) the defendant surrender any and all passports he may have to the Office of the Richmond County District Attorney and is prohibited from applying for any new or replacement passports; (2) the defendant wear an electronic monitoring bracelet, with monitoring services to be provided by an entity approved by the Office of the Richmond County District Attorney and paid for by the defendant; and (3) the defendant not travel outside of the counties comprising the City of New York in the State of New York, subject to any modification directed by the Supreme Court, Richmond County… . People ex rel. Brackley v Warden, Brooklyn Detention Complex, 2016 NY Slip Op 04247, 2nd Dept 6-1-16

CRIMINAL LAW (WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SUSTAINED, BAIL GRANTED)/HABEAS CORPUS (WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SUSTAINED, BAIL GRANTED)/BAIL (WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SUSTAINED, BAIL GRANTED)

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