You are here: / / EVIDENCE OF A 1990 ROBBERY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT TO PROVE IDENTITY SHOULD...
,

EVIDENCE OF A 1990 ROBBERY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT TO PROVE IDENTITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; THE SIMILARITIES WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s attempted rape conviction, determined the evidence of a 1990 robbery and sexual assault should not have been admitted as evidence of the identity of the perpetrator. But the burglary, robbery and sexual abuse convictions, apparently stemming from the same incident, were not disturbed:

… [T]he similarities between the alleged 1990 robbery and sexual assault and the attack on the complainant were not sufficiently unique or unusual and did not establish a distinctive modus operandi relevant to establishing the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator in this case. While both incidents involved robberies and sexual assaults of unaccompanied Caucasian women, during daytime hours, in the lobbies of residential buildings, these similarities were not so unique as to give rise to an inference that the perpetrator of each crime was the same individual … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in permitting the People to present evidence regarding the 1990 robbery and assault in order to establish the defendant’s identity … .

The error was harmless as to all of the charges except the attempted rape in the first degree since the proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the erroneously admitted Molineux evidence, was overwhelming as to those other charges, and there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted the defendant on those charges had it not been for the error … . Furthermore, the erroneous admission of the Molineux evidence did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial … . We reach a different conclusion with respect to the defendant’s conviction of attempted rape in the first degree. Because the evidence of the defendant’s guilt of that charge was not overwhelming, the error cannot be deemed harmless, and the defendant’s conviction of that charge must be vacated and a new trial ordered as to that charge … . People v Duncan, 2020 NY Slip Op 07090, Second Dept 11-25-20

 

You might also like
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THAT HIS “BRAKES FAILED” WAS DEEMED SELF-SERVING AND INADMISSIBLE (SECOND DEPT).
The Defendant Had an Expectation of Privacy In an Envelope Containing His Personal Belongings—The Belongings Were Placed in the Envelope Upon Defendant’s Admission to a Hospital—Even though the Police Were Under the Impression the Defendant Was a Crime Victim, Not a Perpetrator, at the Time the Contents of the Envelope Were Examined, the Search Was Not Justified—Defendant Had an Expectation of Privacy Re: the Contents of the Envelope—The People Were Unable to Meet their “Burden of Going Forward” at the Suppression Hearing Because They Could Not Demonstrate the Legality of the Police Conduct
THE BANK FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WITH ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Criteria for Taxpayer Lawsuit Against School District for Misuse of Public Property Not Met; Failure to Serve Notice of Claim Fatal
THE BROKERAGE AGREEMENT DID NOT GIVE PLAINTIFF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE A LOAN ON DEFENDANT’S BEHALF; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION ON A LOAN PROCURED BY DEFENDANT WITHOUT PLAINTIFF’S ASSISTANCE; “EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO …” CRITERIA IN THIS CONTEXT EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANTS OFFERED A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR DEFAULT IN THIS EVICTION ACTION, INCLUDING THE COVID-19-RELATED DELAYS; THE COVID-19 EMERGENCY RENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (CERAP) APPLIES TO EVICTION PROCEEDINGS IN SUPREME COURT, AS WELL AS HOLDOVER PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL COURT (SECOND DEPT). ​
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF’S FAVOR, PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED A POLICE REPORT WHICH RAISED THE QUESTIONS OF FACT, BY SUBMITTING THE REPORT PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY OBJECTIONS TO INADMISSIBLE STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN IT (SECOND DEPT).
Analytical Criteria for a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of Action Where Plaintiff Submits an Affidavit/Analytical Criteria for a Motion to Amend the Complaint

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE DE BOUR STREET STOP REQUIREMENTS, NOT THE TRAFFIC STOP REQUIREMENTS, APPLY... CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD DEGREE IS NOT AN ARMED FELONY; MATTER...