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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / EVIDENCE OF A 1990 ROBBERY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT TO PROVE IDENTITY SHOULD...
Criminal Law, Evidence

EVIDENCE OF A 1990 ROBBERY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT TO PROVE IDENTITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED; THE SIMILARITIES WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s attempted rape conviction, determined the evidence of a 1990 robbery and sexual assault should not have been admitted as evidence of the identity of the perpetrator. But the burglary, robbery and sexual abuse convictions, apparently stemming from the same incident, were not disturbed:

… [T]he similarities between the alleged 1990 robbery and sexual assault and the attack on the complainant were not sufficiently unique or unusual and did not establish a distinctive modus operandi relevant to establishing the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator in this case. While both incidents involved robberies and sexual assaults of unaccompanied Caucasian women, during daytime hours, in the lobbies of residential buildings, these similarities were not so unique as to give rise to an inference that the perpetrator of each crime was the same individual … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in permitting the People to present evidence regarding the 1990 robbery and assault in order to establish the defendant’s identity … .

The error was harmless as to all of the charges except the attempted rape in the first degree since the proof of the defendant’s guilt, without reference to the erroneously admitted Molineux evidence, was overwhelming as to those other charges, and there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have acquitted the defendant on those charges had it not been for the error … . Furthermore, the erroneous admission of the Molineux evidence did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial … . We reach a different conclusion with respect to the defendant’s conviction of attempted rape in the first degree. Because the evidence of the defendant’s guilt of that charge was not overwhelming, the error cannot be deemed harmless, and the defendant’s conviction of that charge must be vacated and a new trial ordered as to that charge … . People v Duncan, 2020 NY Slip Op 07090, Second Dept 11-25-20

 

November 25, 2020
Tags: Second Department
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THE CRIMINAL LAW DEFINITION OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY IS NOT THE STANDARD FOR ABUSE IN FAMILY COURT, THE STANDARD IS ‘CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF SERIOUS INJURY’ (SECOND DEPT).
SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A CONDITIONAL ORDER OF PRECLUSION SHOULD NOT HAVE GONE BEYOND THE PENALTY DESCRIBED IN THE ORDER (SECOND DEPT).
THE DEFENDANT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, WHOSE ANSWER HAD BEEN STRUCK, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES (FIRST DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY’S FEES AS A SANCTION FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT BECAUSE THE CONDUCT DID NOT OCCUR WITHIN THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).
LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE, MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE INSTALLATION OF LARGE INDVIDUAL LETTERS FOR A SIGN ON THE FRONT SOFFIT OF A BUILDING CONSTITUTED “ALTERING” THE BUILDING TO WHICH LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) APPLY; BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION OF THE SOFFIT (WHICH COLLAPSED), THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK POSTED ON YELP WAS OPINION, NOT ACTIONABLE LIBEL.

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