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SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A CONDITIONAL ORDER OF PRECLUSION SHOULD NOT HAVE GONE BEYOND THE PENALTY DESCRIBED IN THE ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined that the sanction imposed for plaintiff’s failure to turn over audio files and transcripts she was apparently relying upon to prove employment discrimination should not have gone beyond the terms of the conditional order of preclusion:

“A conditional order of preclusion requires a party to provide certain discovery by a date certain, or face the sanctions specified in the order” … . ” With this conditioning, the court relieves itself of the unrewarding inquiry into whether a party’s resistance was willful'” … . “When a plaintiff fails to timely comply with a conditional order of preclusion, the conditional order becomes absolute” … .

… [W]here, as here, a conditional order of preclusion specifies a penalty for the failure to comply, absent a change in circumstances, it is inappropriate for the court to impose a harsher penalty … . The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in barring the plaintiff from offering any evidence for any claim premised on the introduction of or which relies on the audio files the plaintiff failed to produce. Instead, the appropriate sanction was the one set forth in the conditional order of preclusion, which precluded the plaintiff from using the audio files and corresponding transcripts at trial unless she produced these items by a date certain, which she failed to do. Felice v Metropolitan Diagnostic Imaging Group, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 02067, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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