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IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 TRIAL, THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION BASED UPON THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE BETTER PRACTICE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RESERVE ON THE MOTION AND LET THE MATTER GO TO THE JURY; AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE LABOR LAW 200 VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE VERDICT WAS INCONSISTENT; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 should have been denied and plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) in this Labor Law 240 (1), 241 (6) and 200 scaffold-fall case should have been granted. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action were granted because the court found defendants exempt pursuant to the homeowner exemption. Plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict because the jury found the defendant homeowner (Nielson) was negligent in striking the scaffold with a Bobcat, but also illogically found the negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident:

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, we conclude that different inferences could be drawn from the evidence on the issue of whether Nielson had authority to or exercised authority to direct or control the work. Affording the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was a rational process by which a jury could find that the defendants were not exempt from liability by reason of the homeowner exemption under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), and could find that they were liable under Labor Law § 200 … .

We note that, in the interest of judicial economy, the better practice would have been for the Supreme Court to reserve determination on the motion for a directed verdict on the Labor Law causes of action, and allow those causes of action to go to the jury. “There is little to gain and much to lose by granting the motion for judgment as a matter of law after . . . the evidence has been submitted to the jury and before the jury has rendered a verdict. If the appellate court disagrees, there is no verdict to reinstate and the trial must be repeated” … . …

Assuming that Nielson struck the scaffold with the Bobcat, which was the only theory of common-law negligence presented by the plaintiff, then it is logically impossible under the circumstances to find that such negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident. Thus, the issues of negligence and proximate cause were so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find Nielson negligent without also finding proximate cause. Brewer v Ross, 2020 NY Slip Op 06483, Second Dept 11-12-20

 

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