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INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS IN THE ZONE OF DANGER AND WITNESSED A TRUCK STRIKE AND KILL HER BROTHER; SHE ALLEGED SEVERE EMOTIONAL TRAUMA; DEFENDANT’S DISCLOSURE DEMANDS FOR PLAINTIFF’S FACEBOOK, SNAPCHAT AND INSTRAGRAM ACCOUNTS, AS WELL AS THE PHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES, OF INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FRIENDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s disclosure demand for the Facebook, Snapchat and Instagram accounts of infant plaintiff, as well and the last known addresses and phone numbers of infant plaintiff’s friends should have been granted. Infant plaintiff was crossing the street with her brother when he was struck and killed by a truck allegedly owned by defendant. Infant plaintiff claimed psychological injuries based upon her being in the zone of danger and witnessing her brother’s death:

… [T]he defendant demonstrated that records from the infant plaintiff’s Facebook, Snapchat, and Instagram accounts were “reasonably likely to yield relevant evidence” regarding the alleged emotional and mental trauma that the infant plaintiff suffered from as a result of the subject accident, which allegedly was, in part, evidenced by her social isolation and withdrawal … . In addition, the defendant demonstrated that its request for the last known addresses and phone numbers of three of the infant plaintiff’s friends was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the infant plaintiff’s claimed mental and emotional trauma. In response, the plaintiffs do not contend that the requested disclosure was unduly burdensome, overbroad, or otherwise improper. The Supreme Court erred in finding that disclosure of the last known addresses and phone numbers of the infant plaintiff’s three friends was improper because they would provide evidence that was cumulative of other evidence previously exchanged during discovery. Therefore, under the circumstances, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to compel the plaintiffs to produce the last known addresses and phone numbers of three friends of the infant plaintiff, and authorizations to obtain records from the infant plaintiff’s Facebook, Snapchat, and Instagram accounts. Abedin v Osorio, 2020 NY Slip Op 06478, Second Dept 11-12-20

 

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