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A POLICE OFFICER DIRECTING TRAFFIC IS PERFORMING A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION REQUIRING THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION; THE OFFICER AND THE CITY ARE THEREFORE IMMUNE FROM LIABLITY FOR A RELATED ACCIDENT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city defendants and defendant police officer (McMillan) were entitled to summary judgment in this traffic accident case. It was alleged that McMillan negligently directed the vehicle which struck plaintiff to enter the intersection. Because directing traffic is a governmental function requiring the exercise of discretion, the governmental function immunity doctrine controls:

… [T]he City defendants and McMillan established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the negligence cause of action insofar as asserted against them irrespective of the conflicting evidence as to whether McMillan directed the driver of the vehicle into the intersection. Under the facts as alleged, if McMillan directed the driver of the vehicle into the intersection, McMillan’s action was discretionary and he and the City defendants are thus immune from liability under governmental function immunity … . If, on the other hand, McMillan was standing on the side of the road not directing any traffic, there was no negligent act and no basis for liability for him or the City defendants … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Hershkovitz v Brown, 2025 NY Slip Op 00436, Second Dept 1-29-25

Practice Point: A police officer directing traffic is performing a governmental function requiring the exercise of discretion. The officer and the city are therefore immune from liability for a related traffic accident.

 

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