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DEFENDANT MANUFACTURER OF METAL ROOFING WAS A CONTRACTOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) BECAUSE IT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK, EVEN IF IT DID NOT DO SO; PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A ROOF WHERE THE METAL ROOFING WAS BEING INSTALLED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant Union was a contractor within the meaning of Labor Law 240 (1) and plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment against Union on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action stemming from his fall from the roof of a residence where metal roofing manufactured by Union was being installed by plaintiff’s employer:

It is well settled that the Labor Law “holds . . . general contractors absolutely liable for any breach of the statute even if the job was performed by an independent contractor over which [they] exercised no supervision or control” … , inasmuch as “[t]heir status as contractors is dependent on their right to exercise control, not whether they in fact did so” … . In determining whether a defendant may be found liable pursuant to section 240 (1), it is well settled that, where, as here, a defendant “ha[s] the authority to choose the part[y] who did the work, and directly enter[s] into [a] contract[] with th[at party], it ha[s] the authority to exercise control over the work, even if it [does] not actually do so” … .

… [P]laintiff submitted evidence establishing that Union entered into a contract with plaintiff’s employer to install the roofing materials at issue and that the contract provided Union with the power to, inter alia, perform inspections, stop work, and remove plaintiff’s employer from the job. We therefore conclude that plaintiff demonstrated as a matter of law that Union is a “contractor” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1) … . Barker v Union Corrugating Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 05349, Fourth Dept 10-2-20

 

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