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Failure to Pay Pension Benefits to Wife Pursuant to Divorce Was an Action which Accrued Anew Each Time a Payment Was Missed for Statute of Limitations Purposes—Plaintiff Could Sue Only for Missed Payments Going Back Six Years from When Payments Began

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Pursuant to a divorce, plaintiff was entitled to a share of her husband’s pension benefits starting in 1991.  Plaintiff did not start receiving the payments until 2005.  She did not bring an action on the unpaid benefits between 1991 and 2005 until 2010.  The Fourth Department determined that a cause of action for the unpaid benefits accrued anew when each payment was missed.  Because the statute of limitations is six years, the plaintiff could sue only for the unpaid benefits which accrued during the six years prior to when her action was started in 2010.  Bielecki v Bielecki, CA 12-01393, 264, 4th Dept, 5-3-13

 

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