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SENTENCING COURT DID NOT MAKE THE APPROPRIATE FINDINGS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING, MATTER SENT BACK, BECAUSE THE LEGALITY OF THE SENTENCE IS IMPLICATED THE ISSUE NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court did not make the appropriate findings in support of imposing electronic monitoring as a condition probation. The matter was sent back. The court noted that the issue involves the legality of the sentence and therefore need not be preserved for appeal:

A sentencing court imposing probation may require the defendant, pursuant to the statute, to submit to electronic monitoring (see § 65.10 [4]). “Such condition may be imposed only where the court, in its discretion, determines that requiring the defendant to comply with such condition will advance public safety, probationer control or probationer surveillance” (id.). Here, the court failed to make such a determination. To the contrary, it is evident from our review of the sentencing minutes that the court did not consider defendant or his actions to pose a threat to public safety. There may, however, be a legitimate purpose for the electronic monitoring based on probationer control or probationer surveillance. Therefore, we modify the judgment by striking the condition of probation requiring that defendant submit to surveillance via electronic monitoring and pay the fees associated therewith, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court to make a discretionary determination whether to impose electronic monitoring based on appropriate findings. People v Fitch, 2019 NY Slip Op 01973, Fourth Dept 3-15-19

 

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