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THE FINDING THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1180 (d) (SPEEDING) WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; THE POLICE OFFICER DESCRIBED AN INCIDENT ON A DIFFERENT DATE AT THE HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the administrative finding that petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1180 (d) (speeding) was not supported by substantial evidence because the police officer described an incident on a different date at the hearing:

At the hearing, the police officer, who issued the summons to the petitioner, testified about events which occurred on March 18, 2016, which was not the date that the alleged offense occurred according to the summons issued to the petitioner. While the substantial evidence standard “demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable'” … , here, there was no testimony or evidence provided to demonstrate that the petitioner operated his vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(d) on March 8, 2016. Given the discrepancy between the date of the offense as set forth in the summons and the testimony of the officer, relying on his notes which also referred to March 18, 2016, the record does not demonstrate that the ALJ was presented with substantial evidence that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(d) on March 8, 2016 … . Matter of Batra v Egan, 2020 NY Slip Op 04300, Second Dept 7-29-20

 

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