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ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A STORM IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME OF THE SLIP AND FALL, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE ICE FORMED AFTER A PRIOR STORM AND WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS HAD CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK; DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case should not have been granted. Although there was a storm in progress at the time of the slip and fall, there were questions of fact whether ice had formed from a storm two days before and whether the defendants had constructive notice of the condition:

Under the storm in progress rule, “[a] property owner will not be held liable in negligence for a plaintiff’s injuries sustained as the result of an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter” … . Here, in support of their summary judgment motion, the defendants submitted climatological data which showed that on January 26, 2015, trace amounts of snow fell in the morning, and that the snow began to increase in intensity at about the time of the accident and continued into the next day. That same data, however, also showed that 3.6 inches of snow fell on January 24, 2015, and that 2 inches of snow depth remained on January 26, 2015. Although the defendants established that a snowstorm was in progress at the time of the plaintiff’s fall, the defendants failed to establish that the plaintiff’s fall was a result of an icy condition which developed as a result of the snowfall on January 26, and not that of January 24 … . Notably, while the defendants provided evidence of their general snow removal practices, they provided no evidence regarding any specific removal efforts following the January 24 storm, including on January 26 prior to the plaintiff’s fall. Thus, the defendants failed to establish that the plaintiff slipped and fell on an icy condition that was a product of the storm in progress, or that they lacked constructive notice of a preexisting condition … . Kearse v 40 Wall St. Holdings Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 04296, Second Dept 7-29-20

 

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