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THE DEMONSTRATION THAT THE APPELLANTS’ VEHICLE WAS STOPPED WHEN IT WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN APPELLANTS’ FAVOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined appellants’ motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case should have been granted. Appellants demonstrated their vehicle was stopped when it was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Bruce. Bruce’s assertion that appellant’s vehicle made a sudden stop was not sufficient to raise a question of fact:

The appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the second amended complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them by demonstrating that their vehicle was stopped when it was struck in the rear by the vehicle operated by Bruce … . … Bruce’s bare assertion that the appellants’ vehicle made a sudden stop, without more, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether … the operator of the appellants’ vehicle, was partly at fault, so as to defeat summary judgment … . Ross v JFC Intl., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 03935, Second Dept 7-15-20

 

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