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THE CASINO WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS DRINKING WITH THE MAN WHO ASSAULTED HER AFTER SHE LEFT THE CASINO DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF AFTER SHE LEFT THE PREMISES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendant casino’s motion for summary judgment in this third-party assault case was properly granted. Plaintiff alleged she was drinking in defendant casino and left with the man who had brought her drinks. The man sexually assaulted the plaintiff in a car:

A cause of action alleging negligence “must be founded upon a breach by a defendant of a legal duty owed to a plaintiff” … . “Landowners in general have a duty to act in a reasonable manner to prevent harm to those on their property” … . “In particular, they have a duty to control the conduct of third persons on their premises when they have the opportunity to control such persons and are reasonably aware of the need for such control” … . However, a landowner’s duty is “limited to conduct on its premises, which it had the opportunity to control, and of which it was reasonably aware” … .

Here, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that it did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff with respect to her subsequent, off-premises sexual assault perpetrated by a man she met at a casino bar earlier in the evening … . Stenson v Genting N.Y., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 03939, Second Dept 7-15-20

 

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