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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SAW WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE SEEN BEFORE THE EMPLOYEE’S GARBAGE CART COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S SCOOTER AS PLAINTIFF BACKED OUT OF AN ELEVATOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined questions of fact raised by the defendant housing authority’s evidence precluded summary judgment. Plaintiff was injured when a custodian pushing a cart collided with plaintiff’s scooter as plaintiff backed out of an elevator. The custodian’s claim that he could see clearly in front of him raised a credibility issue:

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Here the evidence the Housing Authority submitted in support of the motion was insufficient to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence did not eliminate any material issue of fact as to whether its employee was negligent in handling the garbage cart at the time of the incident. The employee testified at his deposition that he was told to watch for people in the hallways and to never fill the cart too high so as to block his vision at the front of the cart. He never loaded the cart higher than chest height, at the time of the accident there was nothing obstructing his view, and he always looked in front of him when pushing the cart to make sure no one was in front of him. At the time of the incident he could see clearly in front of him, he was not walking fast, and he was cautiously pushing the cart with his usual force. The employee further testified at his deposition that he first saw the plaintiff only after he felt the impact of his cart striking the plaintiff, and he stopped to see what had occurred. It is undisputed that the plaintiff had been on his scooter backing out of the elevator before the impact, which raises a question as to the credibility of the employee’s testimony that he could see clearly in front of him as he was pushing the cart, when he did not see or hear the elevator open or the plaintiff backing out of the elevator. Further, there is a question of fact as to whether the employee was negligent in failing to “see what should be seen” … . Since the Housing Authority failed to eliminate all questions of fact as to the happening of the accident, the Supreme Court should have denied its motion without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers … . Richardson v County of Nassau, 2017 NY Slip Op 09187, Second Dept 12-27-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SAW WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE SEEN BEFORE COLLIDING WITH PLAINTIFF’S SCOOTER AS PLAINTIFF BACKED OUT OF AN ELEVATOR (SECOND DEPT))

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