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MOTIONS FOR SEVERANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motions for severance should have been granted. The lawsuit was brought by healthcare employers against several insurance brokers to recover assessments levied by the Workers’ Compensation Board for a $220 million shortfall in a Workers’ Compensation trust:

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of the appellants’ motions which were pursuant to CPLR 603 to sever the action insofar as asserted against them. While all of the plaintiffs are seeking to recover damages pursuant to the same theories of liability, each separate plaintiff is asserting causes of action only against its respective broker with which it had a client-broker relationship. The appellants have persuasively argued that individual issues predominate, concerning particular circumstances applicable to each plaintiff and to each appellant … . In addition, a single trial of all the causes of action would prove unwieldy and confuse the trier of fact … . Accordingly, in the interests of convenience and avoidance of prejudice, the court should have granted … . Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v Cool Insuring Agency, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 01040, Second Dept 2-13-20

 

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