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DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY’S AFFIRMATION STATING HE NEVER RECEIVED THE PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS NOT REBUTTED BY PLAINTIFF; THE COURT NEVER HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE MOTION AND THE RESULTING JUDGMENT WAS A NULLITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant’s (White’s) attorney’s affirmation stating he never received the bank’s summary judgment motion for a judgment of foreclosure deprived to court of jurisdiction and rendered the judgment a nullity:

“The failure to give a party proper notice of a motion deprives the court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion and renders the resulting order void” … . White’s opposition to the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, for a judgment of foreclosure and sale included his attorney’s affirmation, wherein his attorney stated that the attorney never received the summary judgment motion. In reply, the plaintiff did not submit an affidavit of service or other proof of service demonstrating that the summary judgment motion had been served on White’s counsel. The plaintiff’s assertions are insufficient to raise a presumption that White was served with the summary judgment motion … . At the time White’s attorney brought to the Supreme Court’s attention that the attorney had not received the motion for summary judgment and, in response, the plaintiff failed to submit any proof of service of the motion, the court was presented with evidence that the order … , was a nullity … . Under such circumstances, there was never a default in opposing the motion for summary judgment, and thus, there was no need for White to demonstrate a reasonable excuse or a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, for a judgment of foreclosure and sale and vacated so much of the order … as granted the summary judgment motion … . MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v White, 2020 NY Slip Op 00269, Second Dept 1-17-20

 

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