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WOOD WHICH HAD FALLEN TO THE GROUND FROM A SPLIT RAIL FENCE IS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION WHICH IS NOT ACTIONABLE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined wood from a split rail fence which had fallen to the ground was open and obvious and therefore not actionable in this slip and fall case:

A landowner has a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition . There is, however, no duty to protect or warn against conditions that are open…  and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . Here, the defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating, prima facie, that the wood on the ground was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … . Swinney v Nassau County, 2020 NY Slip Op 00169, Second Dept 1-8-20

 

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