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JURY CONFUSION AND THE INCONSISTENT VERDICT IN THIS LABOR LAW 241(6) ACTION REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL; EVEN A WORKER AUTHORIZED TO BE WITHIN THE RANGE OF AN EXCAVATOR BUCKET CAN CLAIM THE PROTECTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION WHICH PROHIBITS WORK IN AN AREA WHERE A WORKER MAY BE STRUCK BY EXCAVATION EQUIPMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the inconsistent verdict in this Labor Law 241(6) action required a new trial. The trial court had dismissed the action. The Second Department noted that even though plaintiff was a member of an excavator crew and therefore was authorized to be within range of a moving excavator bucket he still claim the protections provided by 12 NYCRR 23-9.5(k) which provides “[p]ersons shall not be . . . permitted to work in any area where they may be struck . . . by any excavation equipment.” Plaintiff’s hand was crushed by an excavator bucket:

The jury returned a verdict finding that the City defendants violated Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) 23-4.2(k), but that the violation was not a substantial factor in causing the accident. Although the instructions on the verdict sheet directed the jury to end its deliberations if it found that the violation of Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) 23-4.2(k) was not a substantial factor in causing the accident, the jury further found that the injured plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident. The jury then proceeded to apportion fault 25% to the City defendants and 75% to the injured plaintiff. After the Supreme Court instructed the jurors to reconsider its verdict, the jury returned a second verdict which was identical to the first verdict, except that the jurors did not answer the questions as to the injured plaintiff’s negligence and apportionment of fault. …

“When a jury’s verdict is internally inconsistent, the trial court must direct either reconsideration by the jury or a new trial” ( …see CPLR 4111[c] …). “On reconsideration, the jury [is] free to substantively alter its original statement so as to conform to its real intention, and [is] not bound by the terms of its original verdict inasmuch as that verdict was not entered by the court” … . “Even after reconsideration by the jury, a trial court has discretion to set aside a verdict which is clearly the product of substantial confusion among the jurors” . “A new trial should be granted where . . . the record demonstrates … substantial confusion among the jurors in reaching a verdict” … . Torres v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 00170, Second Dept 1-8-20

 

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