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SUPPORT MAGISTRATE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO VACATE MAINTENANCE ARREARS; THE FORMER HUSBAND DEMONSTRATED THE FORMER WIFE WAIVED HER RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS 16 YEARS BEFORE THE PETITION WAS BROUGHT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the former husband’s (appellant’s) objection to the support magistrate’s order that appellant pay maintenance arrears should have been granted. The support magistrate had terminated the former wife’s (respondent’s) right to maintenance payments but held she did not have the authority to vacate the arrears. The Second Department held respondent had waiver her right to maintenance payments years before and appellant was not obligated to pay the arrears:

… [P]ursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(9)(b), a prior judgment or order as to maintenance may be modified or annulled after the accrual of such arrears where “the defaulting party shows good cause for failure to make an application for relief from the judgment or order directing payment prior to the accrual of such arrears” … . …

The appellant demonstrated that in June 2001, the respondent waived her right to receive maintenance payments … . “A valid waiver requires no more than the voluntary and intentional abandonment of a known right which, but for the waiver, would have been enforceable'” … . “It may arise by either an express agreement or by such conduct or failure to act as to evince an intent not to claim the purported advantage” … . Here, the evidence adduced at the hearing demonstrated that after the appellant stopped paying maintenance beginning in June 2001 pursuant to the parties’ alleged oral agreement, the respondent did not make any written demands or otherwise move to enforce the maintenance provision of the parties’ judgment of divorce for a period of more than 16 years. Although a waiver “is not created by negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness, and cannot be inferred from mere silence” … , the respondent’s conduct evinced an intent by her to abandon her right to maintenance payments and supported the appellant’s claim that she had orally agreed to terminate his maintenance obligation in June 2001 … . Matter of Makris v Makris, 2020 NY Slip Op 00139, Second Dept 1-8-20

 

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ALTHOUGH THE CHILD WAS 17 AND HAD A LONG STANDING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP... PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT SIGNATORIES TO CONTRACTS WHICH REQUIRED ARBITRATION OF WAGE-UNDERPAYMENT...