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JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE ON PLAINTIFF’S INACTION RE A FORGED DEED NOT DEMONSTRATED, CRITERIA FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL THEREFORE NOT MET.

The Second Department determined defendant was not entitled to summary judgment in a quiet title action under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Plaintiff alleged a deed which purported to transfer her title to the property was forged. Defendant, citing the delay in plaintiff’s taking action, sought dismissal of the complaint on equitable estoppel grounds. The Second Department determined the “justifiable reliance” element of equitable estoppel had not been demonstrated:

Although [defendant] made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff knew of the allegedly forged deed transferring title from her to Edward Wallace, unjustifiably delayed almost two years in commencing this action from the time she was advised to do so by the Kings County District Attorney’s Office, and intended her delay to be acted upon, and that [defendant] lacked knowledge of the allegedly forged deed and prejudicially changed its position … , [defendant] failed to establish, prima facie, that its reliance upon the plaintiff’s conduct was justified … . Wallace v BSD-M Realty, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 05917, 2nd Dept 8-31-16

REAL PROPERTY (JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE ON PLAINTIFF’S INACTION RE A FORGED DEED NOT DEMONSTRATED, CRITERIA FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL THEREFORE NOT MET)/EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE ON PLAINTIFF’S INACTION RE A FORGED DEED NOT DEMONSTRATED, CRITERIA FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL THEREFORE NOT MET)

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