You are here: / / CORPORATE OFFICER MAY BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR WRONGFUL EVICTION PURSUANT...
, ,

CORPORATE OFFICER MAY BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR WRONGFUL EVICTION PURSUANT TO REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) 853 (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the landlord’s (Huntress’s) motion for summary judgment dismissing the tenant’s (Kingsbury’s) action for wrongful eviction (RPAPL 853) should not have been granted:

The sole contention raised by Huntress in support of his motion with respect to the first cross claim was that he could not be personally liable inasmuch as he was acting as an agent of a disclosed principal. We conclude that Huntress failed to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to that cross claim and, as a result, the burden never shifted to Kingsbury to raise a triable issue of fact … .

“It is well established that [a] corporate officer may be held personally liable for a tort of the corporation if he or she committed or participated in its commission, whether or not his or her acts are also by or for the corporation’ ” … . A cause of action under RPAPL 853 sounds in tort … . Here, Huntress failed to establish that he did not participate in the eviction of Kingsbury, and he therefore failed to establish as a matter of law that he cannot be held personally liable if the eviction violated RPAPL 853 … . Canandaigua Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v Acquest S. Park, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 09130, Fourth Dept 12-20-19

 

You might also like
DEFENDANT WAS NOT PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM WHEN HIS SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION WAS CHANGED, MATTER REMITTED FOR RESENTENCING (FOURTH DEPT).
A STACK OF DRYWALL LEANING AGAINST A WALL AND PARTIALLY BLOCKING A DOORWAY FELL OVER ON PLAINTIFF’S ANKLE AS PLAINTIFF ATTEMPTED TO MOVE IT; THE LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). ​
Appellate Court Recognized Prior Decision Was “Clearly Erroneous” and Did Not Hold Trial Court to It
THE SORA HEARING JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED AN UPWARD DEPARTURE, INCREASING DEFENDANT’S SORA RISK LEVEL, BASED ON INFORMATION WHICH WAS NOT IN THE RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (RAI) OR RAISED BY THE PEOPLE AT THE HEARING; TO DO SO VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS (FOURTH DEPT).
THE JUDGE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER FATHER’S ARGUMENTS OPPOSING THE CHILD’S RELOCATION WITH MOTHER AND FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT IN SUPPORT OF THE AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO MOTHER, MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).
WHEN A WITNESS’S IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT FROM A PHOTOGRAPH SHOWN TO HIM BY THE POLICE IS DEEMED “CONFIRMATORY,” THAT CONCLUSION IS TANTAMOUNT TO A DETERMINATION AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE POLICE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS NOT SUGGESTIVE AND COULD NOT HAVE LED TO THE MISIDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE WITNESS KNEW THE DEFENDANT WELL; HERE THE PROOF THE IDENTIFICATION WAS CONFIRMATORY WAS INSUFFICIENT; THE IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).
TOWN DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALMART STORE, NEGATIVE DECLARATION ANNULLED.
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ASSUMED THE RISK OF STRIKING A SNOWMAKING MACHINE.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FAMILY COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSPENDED MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS;... THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFFS WERE PASSENGERS HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY ON A THROUGH...