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THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFFS WERE PASSENGERS HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY ON A THROUGH ROAD; WHETHER DEFENDANT’S CAR STOPPED AT THE STOP SIGN BEFORE PULLING OUT INTO THE PATH OF PLAINTIFFS’ CAR WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-passengers’ motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case should have been granted. The Hernandez/Transit car, in which plaintiffs were passengers, had the right of way on a through road. The defendant Desriviere’s car was on an intersecting street with a stop sign. The Second Department held that the fact the Desriviere car may have stopped at the stop sign before entering the intersection did not raise a relevant question of fact:

As a general matter, a driver who fails to yield the right-of-way after stopping at a stop sign in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a) is negligent as a matter of law … . The driver with the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the other motorist will obey traffic laws that require him or her to yield … . Yet, “a driver traveling with the right-of-way may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident” … . Here, Hernandez and Julie P. Transit established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that (1) Hernandez had the right-of-way, (2) that because Desriviere failed to yield the right-of-way upon entering the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), he was negligent as a matter of law, and (3) that Desriviere’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . The question of whether Desriviere stopped at the stop sign is not dispositive, since the evidence established that he failed to yield even if he did stop … . Belle-Fleur v Desriviere, 2019 NY Slip Op 09244, Second Dept 12-24-19

 

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