You are here: / / FAMILY COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSPENDED MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS;...
,

FAMILY COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSPENDED MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS; THE PAYMENTS WERE GOVERNED BY THE PARTIES’ SEPARATION AGREEMENT, AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined Family Court exceeded its jurisdiction in suspending maintenance payments to mother because the maintenance was provided for in the parties’ separation agreement:

… [W]e agree with the mother and the AFC [attorney for the child] that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in suspending maintenance payments to the mother inasmuch as the parties’ separation agreement setting forth that obligation is an independent contract … . Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute … , and “[i]t generally has no subject matter jurisdiction to reform, set aside or modify the terms of a valid separation agreement”… . We therefore modify the order by vacating the tenth provision of the second ordering paragraph insofar as it relates to the suspension of maintenance payments, and we remit the matter to Family Court for a determination of the amount of any maintenance arrears … . Matter of Krier v Krier, 2019 NY Slip Op 09129, Fourth Dept 12-20-19

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN BROKER AND PLAINTIFF, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR FLOOD INSURANCE (WHICH WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE POLICY) SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Criteria for Non-Negligent Explanation for Striking Vehicle from Behind Described​​​​
PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THE TOWN NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED A SEWER MAIN CAUSING SEWAGE TO BACKFLOW INTO PLAINTIFFS’ HOME; AN INTENTIONAL ENTRY IS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS; THEREFORE THE TRESPASS CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).
STATE WATER RESOURCES LAW DID NOT PREEMPT ZONING BOARD’S REQUIRING TOWN APPROVAL BEFORE WATER CAN BE EXTRACTED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES.
TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS SNOWPLOW TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE SNOWPLOW OPERATOR’S ACTIONS ROSE TO THE RECKLESS DISREGARD STANDARD IN THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FOURTH DEPT).
SUPREME COURT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY-TRIAL GROUNDS, FINDING THAT THE PEOPLE HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THEIR DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS AT THE TIME THE PEOPLE INDICATED THEY WERE READY FOR TRIAL; THE DISMISSAL ORDER WAS NEVER SERVED ON THE PEOPLE SO THE 30-DAY APPEAL PERIOD NEVER STARTED RUNNING RENDERING THE PEOPLE’S APPEAL TIMELY; THE FAILURE TO TURN OVER “DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SERVICES” DOCUMENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE PEOPLE’S DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS BECAUSE THE PEOPLE DID NOT POSSESS THOSE DOCUMENTS (FOURTH DEPT).
THE ONE COUNT INDICTMENT WAS RENDERED DUPLICITOUS BY THE BILL OF PARTICULARS AND WAS DISMISSED AFTER TRIAL; THE APPELLATE COURT NOTED THAT EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE HAD BEEN NARROWED AT TRIAL, DISMISSAL WOULD STILL BE REQUIRED BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE PRETRIAL NOTICE OF THE CHARGES (FOURTH DEPT).
SENTENCE MUST BE PRONOUNCED ON EACH COUNT OF THE CONVICTION; SENTENCE VACATED AND REMITTED FOR RESENTENCING (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PORTIONS OF CITY SIDEWALK ELEVATED BY TREE ROOTS AND “REPAIRED”... CORPORATE OFFICER MAY BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR WRONGFUL EVICTION PURSUANT TO...