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THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL HAD NOT BEEN PROVIDED WITH A COPY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT AT THE TIME THE MOTION WAS MADE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined the motion to suppress should not have been granted without a hearing because defense counsel had not been provided with a copy of the search warrant at the time the motion was made:

In evaluating whether a defendant’s factual allegations in a suppression motion are sufficient to warrant a hearing, the court must assess “(1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant’s access to information” … .

We disagree with the County Court’s decision to deny that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which sought to controvert the search warrant without holding a hearing, as defense counsel did not have access to even a redacted copy of the search warrant applications at the time the motion was made … . Although in moving to controvert the search warrant, defense counsel did not make precise factual averments, he was not required to do so as he did not have access to the search warrant applications at issue … . People v Lambey, 2019 NY Slip Op 07793, Second Dept 10-30-19

 

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