You are here: / / PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 42 USC 1983...
, , ,

PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 42 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action under 18 USC 1983, against the county, for violation of his right to a speedy trial:

We reject the County’s argument that it cannot be held liable pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for the alleged misconduct of the office of the District Attorney. Where, as here, a complaint alleges a failure to train and supervise employees regarding legal obligations, “liability for the District Attorney’s actions in his role as a manager of the District Attorney’s office rests with the county” …  and a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 may therefore be maintained against the County for the conduct of the District Attorney’s office insofar as the District Attorney acted as a County policymaker … . Moreover, here, the complaint sufficiently alleges that the District Attorney’s office failed to train and supervise its assistant district attorneys with respect to the constitutional speedy trial rights of the accused persons with whom they interacted, to the extent that they manifested deliberate indifference to those rights … . Victor v County of Suffolk, 2017 NY Slip Op 03796, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

CRIMINAL LAW (PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 18 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL)/CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (18 USC 1983) (SPEEDY TRIAL, PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 18 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL)/MUNICIPAL LAW (SPEEDY TRIAL, PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 18 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL)/SPEEDY TRIAL (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION, PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY UNDER 18 USC 1983 FOR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL)

​

You might also like
THE SCHOOL PRINCIPAL HAD THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE A PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION IN THIS DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING WHICH RESULTED IN THE TERMINATION OF A TENURED TEACHER (SECOND DEPT).
Request for Mugshots and Identifying Information Re: Arrestees for Posting on Petitioner’s Website Denied—Posting of Such Information Would Constitute an Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy
Surrogate’s Court Has Jurisdiction to Determine the Legal Fees Owed to Out-Of-State Counsel for Services to the Estate
LAW OFFICE FAILURE REJECTED AS AN EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
“Temporary Substitute Vehicle” Not Excluded from Supplemental Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Policy
ASSAULT THIRD IS AN INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNT OF ASSAULT SECOND (SECOND DEPT).
PEOPLE’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO JURY INSTRUCTION WHICH (UNNECESSARILY) INCREASED THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED THE PEOPLE TO MEET THAT BURDEN.
DEFENDANTS IN THIS ICY-STEP SLIP AND FALL CASE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY WERE OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORDS WHO WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ICE AND SNOW REMOVAL; DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUBMIT THE LEASE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

Copyright © 2023 New York Appellate Digest, LLC
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PROSECUTOR ACTED AS AN UNSWORN WITNESS DURING SUMMATION, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT... DRIVER WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAITING FOR A RETURN...