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ALTHOUGH THE READY-FOR-TRIAL ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TIMELY, IT WAS ILLUSORY BECAUSE THE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS HAD NOT BEEN FILED; INDICTMENT PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, affirming the “speedy trial” dismissal of the indictment, noted that, although the ready-for-trial announcement was timely, it was illusory because the certificate of compliance with discovery obligations had not been filed:

… County Court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Contrary to the People’s contention, their October 28, 2020 statement of readiness, which, technically, was within the speedy trial time limit, was nevertheless illusory, as they never certified their compliance with their discovery obligation under CPL 245.20 in a certificate of compliance that they were required to file with the court before or at the time they announced their readiness for trial (see CPL 30.30[5]; 245.50[1], [3]). The People’s … statement of readiness was therefore insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock … , and the statutory period to declare readiness had lapsed for speedy trial purposes as of the time the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. People v Brown, 2023 NY Slip Op 01306, Second Dept 3-15-23

Practice Point: A timely ready-for-trial announcement is illusory if the certificate of compliance with discovery obligations has not been filed.

 

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